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Despite a wealth of system architecture frameworks and methodologies available,
approaches to evaluate the robustness and resiliency of architectures for complex sys-
tems or systems of systems are few in number. As a result, system architects may turn
to graph-theoreticmethods to assess architecture robustness and vulnerability to cas-
cading failure. Here, we explore the application of such methods to the analysis of two
real-world system architectures (a military communications system and a search and
rescue system). Both architectures are found to be relatively robust to random vertex
removal butmore vulnerable to targeted vertex removal. Hardening strategies for lim-
iting the extent of cascading failure are demonstrated to have varying degrees of effec-
tiveness. However, in taking a network perspective on architecture robustness and
susceptibility to cascade failure, we find several significant challenges that impede the
straightforward use of graph-theoretic methods. Most fundamentally, the conceptual-





Robustness and resilience are key considerations for system architects
as they are often critical stakeholder concerns.1–5 However, system
architects seeking to ensure that their systems demonstrate robust-
ness and resilience face an increasingly difficult task when those sys-
tems operate in the context of a System of Systems (SoS), given the
potential for emergent behavior in diverse and often autonomous sys-
tems which may be interconnected and interdependent.6–8 Further-
more, engineering in an SoS context may include conflicting or opaque
SoS “authorities”which creates a challenge in identifying andmanaging
influence in an SoS.9–11
Abbreviations: SoS, System of Systems; SoI, System of Interest
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While the resilience of a system is centered on the anticipation,
survival, and recovery from internal and external threats,12 robust-
ness is the constituent term relating to the system’s ability to remain
unchanged in the face of some assault or change. The identification of
system robustness can be critical, and the failure to do so can have seri-
ous, life-threatening consequences. High-profile system failures have
promoted the importance of a system’s robustness. For instance, the
partial collapse of theRonanPoint apartment tower in 1968 in London,
had consequences that far outweigh the initiating damage sustained. A
gas explosion caused damage to load-bearing walls, which resulted in
the collapse of one entire corner of the building, killing four people and
injuring 17.13 While building codes have since been updated to ensure
improved robustness of built structures themselves,13 the robustness
and resilience of the wider systems within which such built structures
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are located is less well assured, as exemplified by the direct and indi-
rect impact of the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London. The resulting
Public Inquiry “Phase 1 Report” details that the principal reason the
fire spread was the aluminium composite cladding filled with plastic
used on the building exterior, and that the London Fire Brigade suf-
fered “...significant systemic and operational failings revealed by the
evidence.”14 A further example that suggests further work is required
to promote consideration of system robustness within the systems
engineering community can be found from the recent (2017) crash of a
WatchkeeperUnmannedAirVehicle into the sea inWales,UK.The sub-
sequent Service Inquiry by theUKDefence SafetyAuthority concluded
that the incident (an aerodynamic stall) was a result of pitot tube block-
ages leading to inaccurate air speed reporting, citing a “lack of system
robustness testing” as an organizational influence thatwas a contribut-
ing factor.15
While systems can be designed with resilience engineering princi-
ples to try to minimize the likelihood and severity of such incidents, eg,
physical or functional redundancy, fail-safe principles, layered defense,
and conducting extensive failure effects mode analysis, it seems that
for complex systems or SoS, further effort is still required to ensure
system resilience.12,16 Despite several architecture frameworks uti-
lized by industry seeking to establish common practices for analyz-
ing architectures within a particular domain,17–21 there is only a rela-
tively sparse literature concerning approaches to evaluating architec-
ture robustness and resilience.16,22–26
Several previous studies have analyzed network representations of
systemarchitectures, sometimesdescribed as social network analysis, to
support their evaluation.27–32 This paper builds on previouswork,33–35
in seeking toexplore the robustness and susceptibility to cascading fail-
ure of candidate system architectures from a network perspective, in
order to assess the extent to which taking a network perspective on
SoS architectures can assist architecture evaluation by helping deter-
mine whether one candidate architecture is more robust or resilient
than another. Such an approach may address notions of dynamic com-
plexity, such as: “what is the effect of the removal of someof these enti-
ties, whether in the form of a single failure or a cascade of failures?”
In this study, we make use of two real-world enterprise architec-
tures originally created and validated by Thales, and chosen as rep-
resentative of real-world SoS architectures featuring a diversity of
entities and relationships. For further details about the use cases, the
interested reader is directed to Ref. 33. The first use case is a Search
and Rescue (SAR) NATO Architecture Framework (NAF)-based archi-
tecture, developed by Thales in order to inform systems architecture
training and help the development of NAF v4.36 The SAR architec-
ture was produced in a common commercial enterprise architecture
software package, created by following the NAF v4 eight architect-
ing stages. The architecture includes the architecture products corre-
sponding toNAFviewpoints described inNAFv4 (corresponding to the
Subjects of Concern andAspects of Concern inNAF v4 parlance)36 and
also includes representations of the high-level operational concept and
the use case scenario.
The seconduse case is a tacticalmilitary communications enterprise
architecture (MComms), created in accordance with the Ministry of
F IGURE 1 Network diagram representing theMilitary
Communications (MComms) use case. A vertex’s size is proportional
to its degree. A vertex’s color represents entity type. Networks
visualized using Gephi, an open source software for exploring and
manipulating networks. Figure reproduced fromRef. 33
Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF), to enable Thales and the
customer to have a shared understanding of the complex environment
withinwhich a tacticalmilitary communications solutionwould have to
interoperate. This architecture was created with the same commonly
used commercial enterprise architecture software package as the SAR
architecture. The architecture was created as part of concept devel-
opment work while developing a bid for a particular client organiza-
tion. The architecture includes the architecture products correspond-
ing to MODAF viewpoints for the “as-is” architecture of the client’s
solutions, along with architecture products corresponding to the “to-
be” architecture of the proposed solution. As is common practice, not
all architecture viewpoints inMODAFhad an architecture product cre-
ated as the selection of viewpoints is tailored to support specific orga-
nizational objectives (in this case, supporting concept development and
the refinement of bid response activity).
Here, we follow previous studies33–35 in representing each archi-
tecture as a network of vertices (representing Capabilities, Services,
and Logical Nodes for the SAR use case, and representing Systems,
Services, Functions, Components, Software. and Capability Configu-
rations for the MComms use case) connected by edges (representing
dependencies and relationships between vertices). A network diagram
of each architecture is shown in Figures 1 and 2.
This paper makes three primary contributions to the emerging lit-
erature describing the application of networks science tools to system
architecting. First, we assess the robustness of two real-world archi-
tectures to vertex removal using two standard centrality metrics as
measures of network viability. Second, we evaluate each architecture’s
susceptibility to cascading failure using a simple threshold model,
POTTS ET AL. 3
F IGURE 2 Network diagram representing the Search and Rescue
(SAR) use case. A vertex’s size is proportional to its degree. A vertex’s
color represents entity type. Networks visualized using Gephi, an open
source software for exploring andmanipulating networks. Figure
reproduced fromRef. 33
before exploring the effects of two hardening strategies for limiting
the extent of this cascading failure. Finally, we assess the strengths
and weaknesses of networks analysis techniques for the evaluation
of system architectures in general, highlighting the challenges that
currently limit their utility, and recommend guiding principles for
architecture robustness evaluation in light of these challenges.
The next section briefly reviews relevant literature and defines
the terms robustness and resilience for the purposes of this paper. A
synthetic motivating example is then introduced, and revisited later,
to provide context for the approach taken in this paper. The theory
supporting the assessment of network robustness is presented. The
methodology used to assess architecture response to perturbation and
susceptibility to cascades is then detailed before the results of the
assessments are presented. Thediscussion then turns to the challenges
of adopting a network perspective to evaluate the robustness of a com-
plex SoS architecture, highlighting the areaswhere caremust be taken,
before conclusions are drawn.
1.1 Literature review
Some authors argue that an SoS is not fit for purpose when it can-
not transfer materials, energy, or information in a timely, correct, cost-
effective way and encourage designers to consider these transfers as
areas to focus on, whether in terms of opportunity enhancement or
risk reduction.22 However, for a complex SoS with considerable scope,
how can an organization refine their focus to something tractable? Fur-
thermore, what makes one SoS configuration more robust or resilient
than another?
Designers are concerned with the ability of their designed systems
to cope with perturbation and change. Several related concepts are
often invoked in discussing this issue. System robustness, for exam-
ple, can be characterized as the ability of a system to withstand
perturbation—its ability to remain unchanged in the face of some
assault or change. Resilience, by contrast, is the ability of a system to
recover from some degree of failure. However, this relatively clean dis-
tinction is difficult to maintain in practice,23,26 where robustly resist-
ing perturbation may always involve some microscale reorganization
or refreshment and recovering from a failure may or may not return
the system to precisely its original functional state. To some extent the
character of a system’s response to perturbation is observer-relative,
depending on subjective factors such as the timescale of interest, the
granularity of the analysis, etc.37,38
Here, wewill use the term resiliency to include the threemost impor-
tant aspects of a system’s ability to cope with perturbation; robust-
ness, howmuch damage a system can withstand before it fails to func-
tion; recovery, the ability of the system to repair or recuperate within
some resource constraints; and adaptability, the ability of the system to
effectively change over time so that its likelihood of success does not
decrease.37 Similarly, resilience has been defined as “the ability to pre-
pare and plan for, absorb ormitigate, recover from, or more successfully
adapt to actual or potential adverse events” (emphasis added).9,12,39
The same aspects of resilience are presented by Madni and Jackson,
and Goerger et al, suggesting notions of anticipation (prepare and
plan for, avoid), resistance (absorb, withstand), respond and adapt to,
and recover from.12,40 There are, however, a wealth of qualities with
which to describe resiliency, and the interested reader is directed to
Ref. 16 for a more detailed review. While other aspects of resilience
may also include: quality, agility, repairability, extensibility, flexibility,
and versatility, here we focus on the three aforementioned aspects of
robustness, recovery, and adaptability.16,41 For this paper, resiliency
can be described as: “a system’s ability to adjust its activity to retain
its basic functionalitywhenerrors, failures, andenvironmental changes
occur.”42
While system resilience has been argued to be an emergent prop-
erty that cannot bemeasured,9 evaluating system robustnessmay pro-
vide a quantifiable means to support resilience engineering. The Engi-
neering Systems community argues that the architecture of a system is
a key contributor to functional behavior and desirable properties, such
as resilience and robustness.5,6 Approaches to evaluate the resiliency
of a system, early in its lifecycle (ie, without probabilistic calculations
of component reliability) are relatively sparse.
Design strategies for improved system robustness have been pro-
posed, such as “Relax a constraint limit on an uncoupled control fac-
tor” or “Create two distinct operating modes for two different demand
conditions” and may aid the design of predominately mechanical sys-
tems (ie, a paper feeder in a printer), but may not be straightforward to
implement for complex engineered systems (ie, an air-traffic manage-
ment system).43 Similarly, “design principles” for resilient enterprise
information systems have been proposed by Zhang and Lin, based on
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derived axioms from literature in ecology, which may usefully prompt
system designers, but whose utility for organizations involved in the
design of complex SoSmaybe limited (eg, see “A resilient system should
be designed to have a certain degree of redundancy, preferably func-
tional redundancy. The more redundancy the system has, the higher
the degree of resilience.”).44
The “SoS Architecting with Ilities (SAI)” method encourages early
phases of SoS design to explicitly include design options: so-called
change options that change the design of the SoS in order to respond to
a perturbation, or so-called resistance options that resist perturbation-
imposed changes in the design of the SoS.25 Deliberate design empha-
sis on ensuring robustness and resiliency seems appropriate. How-
ever, the qualitative generation, evaluation, analysis, and trade-off of
a diverse and ever growing set of “ilities” and “options” for architecture
alternatives places a considerable resource burden on design organi-
zations. Similarly, the following techniques are encouraged to ensure a
design organization arrives at a resilient design: “Developing applica-
ble and realizable resilience heuristics—to inform and guide resilient
system design” and “Developing appropriate resilience metrics—to
evaluate candidate resilience strategies.”40 However, guidance for
resilience metrics and resilience strategies is currently limited in
practice.
Due to the increasing scale and complexity of modern engi-
neered systems, some have turned to a network representation of
a system architecture to gain insights into various aspects such as,
inter alia, architecture complexity,31,45–47 modularity or community
structure,24,31,33 important architectural entities,24,28,29,31,33,48–50
architecture topology,24,28,29,31,33,49,50 etc, although there is little
consensus on the most suitable definitions or measures of these prop-
erties (eg, what makes degree a more suitable measure of influence
than closeness, betweenness or eigenvector centrality, or charac-
teristic path length?).33 Within the engineering design community, a
robust physical design can be interpreted as a design which minimizes
interfaces between subsystems and maximizes interactions within
subsystems, using a network representation of a physical system
architecture (requirements decomposed into subsystems, decom-
posed into components) and clustering algorithms to determine the
extent to which this design principle is applied.51 Within the systems
engineering community, such approaches are perhaps more likely to
be termedmodular designs as opposed to robust designs.33
Furthermore, authors use different approaches to model a system
architecture as a network, with the resultant models sensitive to
fine-grained modeling assumptions of what should be included and
what should be omitted from a model and this sensitivity is a known
challenge for those wishing to utilize a network perspective or a social
network analysis to evaluate a system architecture (eg, some model a
physical system architecture, or a functional architecture, or a logical
architecture, while others model a design structure matrix, others
model multiple domain matrices, while yet others select a subset of a
system architecture).33
Some authors have used a network model of an SoS to examine
failure propagation in order to evaluate the effects of disruptions,
eg, the effect of local airport disruptions on national commercial
air travel, or network models of SoS functions to examine critical
functional dependencies between constituent systems.16 Often these
approaches require considerable complexity in the real SoS to be
abstracted away in order to define a mathematical model of a net-
work; eg, creating “scale-free” or “exponential” network topologies,
upon which resiliency can be evaluated by considering the impact of
vertex removal on message propagation through the network. Again,
however, in real-world SoS architectures such topologies are not
necessarily present and there is an assumption of architectural entity
homogeneity (architectural entities are understood as differing only
in so far as they occupy a different location in the network).32 These
network models can struggle to cope with the heterogeneity of a
complex SoS, even when they employ more sophisticated “multilayer”
network models, or adopt a “narrower” modeling choice in the case of
examining functional dependencies.16,32
The current paper seeks to utilize a network perspective (or social
network analysis) on failure propagation and the identification of
influential entities in terms of their contribution to robustness and
failure cascades, but applied to complex SoS enterprise architectures
modeled as networks. In a departure from other methods, we start
with a network model of a complex real-world SoS created directly
from the enterprise architecture.33 Furthermore, we evaluate the
robustness of an architecture in terms of its susceptibility to vertex
removal measured in terms of the impact on average network central-
ity as a proxy for architecture viability. We also evaluate architecture
robustness in terms of susceptibility to cascading failure using a load
shedding model. This approach may be useful for system architects
undertaking trade-off studies when evaluating competing architec-
tures. Furthermore, the approachmay help ensure subsequent designs
are more robust and resilient by adopting protection strategies for the
entities which, when removed, have the greatest effect on architecture
viability or which are the greatest contributors to cascading failure.
While this approach offers some interesting insights, there are several
significant conceptual hurdles that we wish to highlight so that system
architects attempting to make use of these techniques can do so with
“eyes open” to the challenges they face.
1.2 Motivating example
To help provide context for this work, consider a large commercial
organization that operates primarily as a systems integrator and
currently designs, develops, delivers, and operates Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems in a
maritime SAR setting. The organization has recently developed a
novel, proprietary sensor that provides a new capability to an exist-
ing customer, meeting a stated need expressed in this customer’s
Invitation to Tender (ITT). The customer has requested a new C4I
system with the new sensor integrated, and the organization has
completed an initial design to meet the customer requirements. The
systems engineering manager notes that their system operates within
a broader, complex, maritime SAR SoS with challenges of autonomy,
diversity, operational, and managerial independence, among other
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challenges, and instigates the creation of an Enterprise Architecture,
using a common Architecture Framework to guide their activity.
The customer and supplying organization may both be concerned
with the robustness of the architecture; is one candidate archi-
tecture more robust than another, are some architectural entities
more important in the architecture in the sense that their removal
impacts overall SoS effectiveness (whether the loss of a single entity
is considered or the triggering of a cascade through the architecture),
can hardening or protection strategies be put in place to improve
architecture robustness, and to aid an understanding of the overall SoS
by consideringwhere responsibility for these important entities resides.
While organizations likely have processes and guidelines to support
architecture evaluation,3 and they may have approaches to promote
design principles that encourage resilience,25,40,43 they may not have
enough information early in the system lifecycle to effectively utilize
these (eg, a lack of data to support Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)), or they may have an enterprise architecture that is more
diverse than a product architecture (eg, approaches that are based on
design structure matrices24,48), and more diverse than approaches
that treat an entire SoS as a network.28,29,31
System architects within an organization can instead represent
their enterprise architecture as a network, and ask if one architecture is
more robust to architectural entity changes or removal than another,
and is therefore more desirable than another? For one particular
architecture, which architectural entities are important in the sense
that their removal affects network viability, or triggers cascading
failure, ergo affecting SoS architecture effectiveness? In particular for
a complex SoS, where do these entities exist: are they part of a prime
organization’s remit of control or are they external and thus a source
of technical or operational risk?11,46 This research attempts to provide
system architects with an approach to support such evaluations.
2 APPROACHES
This section introduces and defines graph-theoretic approaches to
exploring network robustness. The selected approaches are later
applied to evaluate the robustness of network representations of
complex system architectures.
2.1 Network perturbation
Large complex networks, such as the World Wide Web, the Internet,
metabolic networks, etc, can be considered to rely on their continued
connectivity for their effective operation. In such networks, the
removal of vertices (nodes) interferes with paths between pairs of
vertices until the network becomes largely disconnected and unable to
effectively function.52,53 Someof thesenetworkshave strongly skewed
degree distributions, with many low-degree nodes and very few high-
degree nodes, or even have degree distributions that are approximated
by power laws, eg, some technological or social media networks. As
a consequence, they tend to exhibit high robustness to the random
removal of vertices but have significant vulnerability to the targeted
removal of the highest degree vertices.54,55 Similar results have been
shown for social and biological networks, eg, email networks56 and
metabolic networks.57 If systems architects could utilize similar anal-
yses they could provide an evaluation of a complex SoS architecture’s
robustness and consider potential recovery and adaption strategies
to ensure overall resiliency, considerations which may influence the
selection of a candidate architecture or inform design decisions.
There are some challenges in applying such approaches to complex
SoS architectures, however, which are introduced here but revisited in
more detail in Section 5. The first is that in complex network research
the removal of a vertex has a very natural meaning in context. For
computer networks, the loss of a vertex models the failure of a system
component. In epidemiology, the loss of a vertex models the death of
an individual or them gaining immunity to the disease being modeled.
In graphical models of complex SoS architecture, however, finding a
meaningful abstraction that corresponds to vertex removal is difficult,
given the heterogeneity of system entities modeled: people, teams,
services, physical systems, software, and communications carriers.
Solutions to this challenge include considering more homogenous
architectures as the starting point: for example, to only model con-
stituent architecture viewpoints, such as parts of a logical system
architectures, where vertex removal would correspond to physical
component failure. However, here we are interested in evaluations
of enterprise architectures, not evaluations of only physical or logical
architectures. Similarly, another solution would be to only consider
removing vertices that correspond more clearly to system entities
failing; eg, only allowing physical entities represented in an enterprise
to be removed, to correspond to a less diverse notion of “failure.” A
potential solution, and the one used in this manuscript, is that the
removal of a vertex is taken to correspond to the failure of a system
entity to cope with some change. As the graphical model represents a
diverse range of system entities and their interactions, the notion of
change employed heremust also capture some diversity: in the context
of a complex SoS architecture, a relevant change might correspond to
an alteration to the operational status of a system (a system becomes
unserviceable for example), a change in environmental conditions, a
change in doctrine or concepts for systems or the overall SoS, etc. In
this way, the removal of a vertex corresponds to a change, internal
or external, that effects the constituent entities of the SoS to such an
extent that the entity is no longer effective.
One approach to characterizing robustness, is to consider the
fraction of vertices in the largest component of the network after
it has suffered a perturbation of some kind.38,58 The larger the size
of this component, the more robust to perturbation the system has
proved to be. This makes sense for, eg, a communication network,
where vertices within the same connected component can be assumed
to communicate with one another. Again, however, the interpretation
for a complex SoS architecture is not always clear. See Section 5.
Relatedly, determining a suitable metric for evaluating system
effectiveness is also conceptually challenging. For instance, while,
for some systems (eg, software systems modeled as networks of
subroutines and relationships between them, or product development
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processes modeled as networks of tasks and information flows
between them),31 changes in the average path length (characteristic
path length) of a graph representation may make sense as a proxy for
system connectivity and thus effectiveness, it is not clear that thismet-
ric would be a suitable measure of effectiveness for the architectures
being considered here. Similarly, in a social network of relationships
between terrorists in “dark networks,” different centrality measures
identify different individuals as most influential as different centrality
measures make different assumptions about what constitutes influ-
ence or importance.59,60 There is an inherent challenge in finding a
suitable network measure to represent architecture effectiveness
despite a range of arguably suitable candidates (eg, average charac-
teristic path length, average degree centrality, average betweenness
or closeness centrality, etc)31,33 and we return to this point in
Section 5.
If an acceptable effectiveness measure can be identified, a further
challenge involves determining how to represent the regime of pertur-
bations that the architecture is subjected to during resiliency analy-
ses. One simple aspect of this challenge is determining whether ver-
tices affected by a perturbation should be selected at random or in a
targeted manner, eg, targeting high-degree vertices first. In the latter
case, is the targeted property (eg, degree) recalculated after each ver-
tex is removed or not? While some studies have recalculated the tar-
get measure,54 while others have not (56,57,) the effects of these rel-
atively fine-grained decisions regarding methods are not known fully
at this stage. More problematically, how can a perturbation regime be
constructed for a model that reflects the fact that challenges to a real-
world system are typically neither random nor targeted, but, rather,
tend to be semistructured as a result of common cause influences such
as spatial or environmental effects, or resourcing problems, and as a
consequence have a somewhat correlated impact on architecture com-
ponents.
2.2 Cascading failure
Given the interconnectedness of a complex SoS it is appropriate to
assess the potential for “avalanches” of failure that spread across an
architecture when perturbed. Models from epidemiology (eg, Suscep-
tible Infectious Removed (SIR) or Susceptible Infectious Susceptible
(SIS) models52,61) are used to assess the spread of disease over a net-
work (or the spread of computer viruses over computer networks56).
Although such models have been widely studied, they become less
tractable, and hence less suitable, for highly heterogeneous systems
such as the SoS architectures being considered here.
Instead, an approach that explores cascading changes in terms of
“load shedding” could be more suitable. In electrical power network
models, the removal of a vertex could correspond to the failure of a
component causing its electrical load to be passed on to its neighbors.
The same idea can be considered for a complex SoS architecture,
where the removal of a vertex corresponds to some change that
has rendered that entity ineffective. The neighboring entities (in the
graphical model) are then required to cope with the demand originally
placed on the entity, or the lack of support from that entity in carrying
out their own function.
The simplest model of such dynamics is provided by Watts;62 a
vertex, i, fails if a given fraction, 𝜙i, of its neighbors have failed. By
allowing different nodes to be assigned different threshold values,
the fact that different entities in an SoS will have different inherent
capacity to cope with change can be reflected. Despite its simplicity,
the model captures important features of complex systems: the role
of local dependencies, structure, connectivity, and heterogeneity (of
elements and of failure thresholds). This model can be used to explore
the effects of an abstract notion of “change” on the SoS architecture in
order to assess its vulnerability to change cascades.
Again, when trying to exploit network science insights to assess
complex SoS architecture resiliency there are significant challenges
which are introduced here but revisited in Section 5. Constructing
accurate models of cascades may require knowledge of the failure
cascade processes thatwould take place in the actual SoS. For example,
would the failure of a communications bearer result in the failure of
the systems that rely on that bearer, and would this lead to the failure
of entire services and capabilities or would the systems simply switch
to another communication bearer to halt the cascade. How long
would such a switch take to occur? Models of how cascades propagate
through a complex SoS are difficult to formulate unless a posteriori
knowledge of the process on the network is provided. Given that the
architecture assessment processes that are the focus of this paper
occur in the early design phases of system lifecycles, possession of this
knowledge is unlikely, although we can imagine the evolving nature of
real-world SoS deployments and the increased focus on Model-Based
Systems Engineering meaning that in some scenarios such knowledge
is available.63 Consequently, since developing detailed models of
dynamic change processes for an SoS architecture may not be feasible
at an early or predesign stage, the focus for a system architect may
perhaps best be placed on understanding the general susceptibility
and impact of cascading changes for a class of architecture, in order to
support architecture selection decisions or inform systemdesignswith
mitigation strategies in mind.
3 METHODOLOGY
For each of the two real-world architectures, anMComms and a SAR, a
subset of the entire architecture is modeled as a directed, unweighted
graphwhere different types of architecture entities are represented as
nodes (termed vertices) connected by links (termed edges) represent-
ing different types of interdependencies or relationships. A network
diagram of each architecture is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Architecture
views used to create the models were selected as representative of
the primary areas of importance for the architectures. The MComms
architecture describes the challenge of enabling effective tactical
communications between soldiers, where the overall ability for a
soldier to be able to communicate effectively with a range of other
actors in adverse environmental conditions over a large and contested
geographical region depends on the ability of the diverse systems
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and agents that make up the SoS. The SAR use case is concerned with
the overall ability to rapidly locate and recover distressed vessels
in changing and adverse environmental conditions and depends on
the ability of the diverse constituent systems, acting as autonomous
agents, to coordinate in order to fulfill the capability demand that none
can achieve alone. For more detail about the use case networks, refer
to Refs. 33–35.
We assess the robustness of each of two use case architectures
to successive vertex removal in three different ways (random, tar-
geted, and live targeted). To measure network viability as vertices
are removed, we use two different centrality metrics (the average
closeness centrality and the average betweenness centrality). We also
employ closeness centrality and betweenness centrality as measures
of which architectural entities are important in the architecture.
Closeness centrality identifies those entities that are (geometrically)
closest to other architecture entities and betweenness centrality
likewise identifies those entities that enable communication between
many entities. The average centrality measure of the overall architec-
ture is a proxy for the overall cohesiveness or effectiveness of the
architecture. Changes in average centrality is therefore a reflection
of the architecture’s robustness as a result of some change. There
are, however, challenges and limitations in using these metrics, eg,
underpinning assumptions of network flows occurring over shortest
paths for betweenness centrality or the handling of paths existing
in directed graphs as considered here for closeness centrality, and
we will return to these challenges in Section 5.33 There is no con-
sensus on the most suitable network measure of importance or
influence in a network; alternative approaches include eigenvector
centrality and characteristic path length.31,33 However, we make
use of closeness centrality and betweenness centrality as they are
commonly used in the networks science literature, and a central
aim of this paper is to consider the extent to which standard net-
works science techniques can be usefully employed in the analysis of
systems architectures.
We perturb each directed graph to an increasing extent by repeat-
edly removing a chosen vertex and its associated edges and then recal-
culating the average centrality of all remaining nodes in the perturbed
network. Vertex removal is repeated N times, until no vertices remain.
Rather than removing vertices at random, a variant of this procedure
selects the highest-degree vertex for removal at each step, either using
the original degree values associated with the unperturbed network
(targeted perturbation), or using the live degree values associatedwith
the increasingly perturbed network (live targeted perturbation).
We evaluate the susceptibility to cascading failure of each architec-
ture using a simple threshold model originally presented by Watts.62
Each vertex, i, in the directed graph, G, is initially labeled “effective”
and is given a threshold value 𝜙i, specifying the fraction of that vertex’s
neighbors that must be in state “ineffective” before it is rendered
ineffective itself. This threshold value is either a fixed uniform value
for all nodes in G, or is drawn from a uniform distribution over a given
range, or a Poisson distribution with a given mean (divided by 10 to
provide a value between 0.1 and 1.0, rejecting any threshold values
greater than 1.0). The cascade is triggered by changing the state of
F IGURE 3 One replicate of the cascading failure algorithm shown
as pseudo-code
a vertex from effective to ineffective. Each vertex then updates their
own state, changing from effective to ineffective if sufficient neighbors
have become ineffective. The cascade runs until no further changes in
state occur. One replicate of the cascading failure algorithm is shown
as pseudo-code in Figure 3.
For each allocation of threshold values to a network,N cascades are
modeled, each triggered by initially perturbing one of the network’s
N vertices. For each network and each method of randomly allocating
threshold values, 24 independent replicates are simulated. This allows
analysis of the degree to which a network is vulnerable to cascades in
general, but also the degree to which particular nodes in the network
aremore liable to generate significant cascades.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Perturbations
Removing the most connected vertices from a network representing
a complex SoS architecture has a significant impact on centrality mea-
sures, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. For both architectures, the effect
of removing even just a small fraction of the highest degree vertices
(recalculating degree as the networks become increasingly perturbed)
has a significant effect on the average Closeness Centrality and aver-
age Betweenness Centrality. Removing vertices at random produces a
more gradual reduction in average centrality measures. These results
are to be expected, however, since removing higher-degree vertices
will tend to increase the distance between the remaining vertices. The
result implies that system architects concerned with the robustness of
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F IGURE 4 Average Closeness Centrality versus the fraction of
SAR use case vertices removed at random (squares), removed in order
of original degree value (circles), and removed in order of current
perturbed degree value (diamonds)
F IGURE 5 Average Closeness Centrality versus the fraction of
MComms use case vertices removed at random (squares), removed in
order of original degree value (circles), and removed in order of
current perturbed degree value (diamonds)
these architectures should pay particular attention to the architectural
entities that are particularly well connected, as their removal has a
significant impact on the overall connectivity of the architecture,which
under the modeling assumptions here relates to the effectiveness of
the SoS. A more robust architectural pattern for both use cases would
be a less hierarchical architecture with a greater overall density.
However, the suitability of such a design change for the architectures
would require further, contextually grounded, analysis.
Targeting nodes in order of their original degree in the unper-
turbed networkmay sometimes increase average Closeness Centrality
F IGURE 6 Variance in average Closeness Centrality across 25
simulation runs (shown asmedian and interquartile range (IQR) as
vertices are removed at random from the SAR network
F IGURE 7 Variance in average Closeness Centrality across 25
simulation runs (shown asmedian and interquartile range [IQR]) as
vertices are removed at random from theMComms network
in the perturbed network for both architectures. Positive assortativity
ensures that removing highdegreenodes tends to reduce thedegreeof
other high degree nodes that become effectively isolated as the origi-
nal highest degree vertices are removed, thus resulting in their removal
having a less significant negative effect (or even a positive effect) on
average closeness of each vertex.
Care should be taken when using an averaged topological property
to make assertions about the robustness of an architecture, however,
as the average value over a number of simulations may hide a large
variance in individual simulation results, as shown in Figures 6 and
7. This variation in average Closeness Centrality as an architecture
is perturbed can be seen in individual simulation runs (Figures 8 and
9). Snapshots of individual simulation runs show that as vertices
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F IGURE 8 Variation in average Closeness Centrality across six
simulation runs as vertices are removed at random from the SAR
network
F IGURE 9 Variation in average Closeness Centrality across six
simulation runs as vertices are removed at random from theMComms
network
are removed average Closeness Centrality can increase, potentially
counterindicating the suitability of topological measures of signifi-
cance as proxies for architecture effectiveness. Increases in average
closeness centrality correspond to the removal of vertices that are not
able to be reached in both directions by all vertices, demonstrating
some of the pitfalls of using network science measures of vertex
significance such as closeness centrality or averages of thesemeasures
over the entire network. For the kind of enterprise architectures
considered herewhich are directed and largely hierarchical and acyclic
networks, there is no guarantee that each vertex can reach every other
in both directions. While some approaches examined in the literature
get around this issue by developing more abstract network models
(ie, modeling away the directionality of relationships or dependencies),
for those architectures where directionality is important, additional
care must be taken in selecting suitable measures of architecture
effectiveness. An alternative solution would be to use the average har-
monic closeness centrality as a proxy instead of closeness centrality.33
However, as we will see in Section 5, despite the choice of network
measures used, there remain significant hurdles to overcome.
Correlations between the significance of a vertex and the impact on
the network of its removal were calculated using various measures of
significance and impact were examined to see if it is possible to pre-
dict which vertices cause large changes in architecture topology. These
correlations were examined for both the original measures calculated
from the unperturbed network (Table 1) and for the “live” measures
recalculated as the network was perturbed (Table 2).
The lack of significant correlations shown in Table 1 suggests that
there is little ability to predict network-level changes in topological
measures of significance by considering vertex-level measures of sig-
nificance calculated from the unperturbed architecture. Such correla-
tions are significant for predictingHarmonicClosenessCentrality from
the recalculated topological measures of vertex significance, but not
for average Closeness Centrality or average Betweenness Centrality
(Table 2). The implication of this result is that as a system architec-
ture is perturbed, system architects cannot look to individual architec-
tural entities to try andpredict the impact of further degradation. Thus,
while the initial connectivity of an architectural entity can serve as an
identifier of importance tooverall architecture effectiveness, this is not
the case as the architecture is perturbed.
4.2 Cascades
The cascading failure model seeks to determine the role of local
dependencies and the structure of the architecture in the potential
for a failure to cascade throughout the architecture, triggered by the
failure of a single entity. The simulation explores the extent towhich an
SoS architecture is robust to cascading failures in a stochastic manner.
For both use cases, the results of cascading failure simulations are
shown as histograms of cascade size (the percentage of ineffective
vertices at the end of a cascade) alongside cumulative distributions of
cascade size (Figures 10, 11, 12).
Snapshotsof individual results of cascading failure simulationacross
the networks are shown in Figures 13 and 14 for the SAR use case
and MComms use case, respectively, where vertices that have failed
are shown in black and edges are colored by the color of their source
vertex, based on initial conditions in which a threshold value of 0.2
is applied to all vertices in each network. For the SAR use case, the
original vertex that fails corresponds to a “Search Node” (an opera-
tional maritime search asset) in the architecture and the failure cas-
cade halts after two iterations with six vertices failed in total, affect-
ing the search service and search capability. For theMComms use case,
the original vertex that fails corresponds to a “system” (a military com-
munications system deployed in the wider SoS) in the architecture and
the failure cascade halts after eight iterations with 27 vertices failed
in total, affecting other systems, services, one function and one opera-
tional capability.
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TABLE 1 Correlations (R2) between the original property of a vertex and the change in an architecture-level topological property caused by
the vertex’s removal













SAR Degree 0.084*** 0.002 0.370***
MComms Degree 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.393***
SAR Closeness Centrality 0.003 0.002 0.074***
MComms Closeness Centrality 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.398***
SAR Betweenness Centrality 0.084*** 0.010** 0.361***
MComms Betweenness Centrality 0.004*** 0.028*** 0.512***
SAR Harmonic Centrality 0.035*** 0.002 0.095***
MComms Harmonic Centrality 0.002** 0.002** 0.055***
*P < .05
**P < .01 and
***P < .001, otherwise R2 is not significant.
TABLE 2 Correlations (R2) between the recalculated property of a vertex and the change in an architecture-level topological property caused
by the vertex’s removal













SAR Degree 0.064*** 0.016*** 0.549***
MComms Degree 0.075*** 0.102*** 0.467***
SAR Closeness Centrality 0.161*** 0.108*** 0.349***
MComms Closeness Centrality 0.267*** 0.291*** 0.596***
SAR Betweenness Centrality 0.097*** 0.122*** 0.715***
MComms Betweenness Centrality 0.121*** 0.553*** 0.808***
SAR Harmonic Centrality 0.016*** 0.002 0.213***
MComms Harmonic Centrality 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.092***
*P < .05
**P < .01 and
***P < .001, otherwise R2 is not significant.
The results demonstrate that the extent to which a failure cascades
through an architecture depends on both the topology of the architec-
ture and the thresholds assigned, with the distribution of cascade sizes
highly sensitive to the initial setting of threshold values. The depen-
dence of failure cascade size on architecture topology is shown for
example in Figure 10, where a threshold value of 0.3 for all vertices
in the MComms use case results in cascade sizes of up to 5% of the
architecture, whereas for the SAR use case cascades may effect 35%
of the network.
The results of this kind of analysis provides a perspective on
architecture robustness when comparing candidate architectures:
under the same modeling assumptions one architecture may be
interconnected and interdependent in such a way that it is particularly
vulnerable, while the converse may also be true. Furthermore, the
analysis reveals the criticality of each vertex, in terms of the size of the
cascade that they trigger when they fail. We explored this further by
correlating cascade size with topological measures of vertex signifi-
cance. A sample of correlations (R2) for both architectures is shown
in Table 3. The most significant correlation found for both use cases
is between the degree of the failing vertex and the resulting cascade
size. Again, this suggests to a system architect that particular focus and
emphasis should be placed on the protection of the most connected
entities in their architecture. Especially in enterprise architectures
where the full extent of an architecture’s connectivity may not be
present without making a deliberate inquiry as relationships and
dependencies may be fragmented across multiple different view-
points. However, even here there are some threshold profiles for both
architectures where degree is not strongly correlated with cascade
size. The lack of significant correlations for these threshold profiles
could indicate that the threshold values assigned to vertices are more
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F IGURE 10 Plots show cascade size distributions forMComms (left) and SAR (right). Columns show frequency distributions for 𝜙 = 0.2 (solid)
and 𝜙 = 0.3 (open). Lines show cumulative frequency distributions for 𝜙 = 0.3 (squares) and 𝜙 = 0.2 (crosses). For the SAR network, no cascades
were triggered in 46% of cases for 𝜙 = 0.2 and 56% of cases for 𝜙 = 0.3. For theMComms networks, the equivalent figures were 67% and 76%
F IGURE 11 Plots show cascade size distributions forMComms (left) and SAR (right). Columns show frequency distributions for 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9]
(solid) and 𝜙i ∈ [0.25,0.75] (open). Lines show cumulative frequency distributions for 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] (squares) and 𝜙i ∈ (crosses). For the SAR
network, no cascades were triggered in 57% of cases for 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] and 81% of cases for 𝜙i ∈ [0.25,0.75]. For theMComms networks, the
equivalent figures were 77% and 83%
significant in determining cascade size than the topological properties
of the failing vertices.
Vertex degree makes sense as a predictor of cascade size to some
extent, but the degree of a failing vertex only accounts for the first step
of the subsequent cascade and does not capture the onward connec-
tions of the vertex’s neighbors. Although other topological measures
of significance based on eigenvector centrality do reflect these higher-
order properties of a vertex’s neighborhood, in our results neither the
eigenvector centrality or Katz centrality correlated more significantly
with cascade size than vertex degree. The lack of strong correlations
between other topological measures of importance and triggered cas-
cade size could be due to the particular topology of the two architec-
tures considered here, a feature of the model dynamics and thresh-
old values used to simulate cascades, or an inherent limitation of the
topological measures of significance considered, or some combination
of these factors.
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Pois(𝜆=5)
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∈ [0.1,1.0]. For theMComms networks, the equivalent figures were 68% and 79%
F IGURE 13 SAR network diagram visualized in Gephi with vertices sized by their degree. Vertices that have failed are shown in black and
edges are colored by the color of their source vertex. For initial conditions of a threshold value of 0.2 applied to all vertices in each the network, the
original vertex that fails corresponds to a “Search Node” (an operational maritime search asset) in the architecture and the failure cascade halts
after two iterations with six vertices failed in total, affecting the search service and search capability
4.3 Hardening against cascades
To what extent can an architect protect their architecture from the
cascading failures explored above? Here, a simple hardening strategy,
inspiredbyother research,38 wasadopted that swapped the thresholds
of the 10 most critical vertices (as identified above) with those of the
10 vertices with the highest assigned thresholds in the network. This
ensures that the most critical vertices are hardened without changing
the “hardness” of the network as a whole, and can be thought as
equivalent to a reallocation of resource to themost critical parts of the
network. The most critical vertices were determined as those associ-
atedwith the largest mean cascade size over 25 simulations employing
a particular threshold profile. The identity of the most critical vertices
depended on which threshold profile was used. For example, the most
critical vertices under a Poisson distribution of thresholds were not
necessarily the same as the most critical vertices identified when a
uniform distribution of threshold values was employed. To control
for the stochastic nature of the threshold assignment, a hardened
POTTS ET AL. 13
F IGURE 14 MComms network diagram visualized in Gephi with vertices sized by their degree. Vertices that have failed are shown in black
and edges are colored by the color of their source vertex. For initial conditions of a threshold value of 0.2 applied to all vertices in each the network,
the original vertex that fails corresponds to a “system” (a military communications system deployed in the wider SoS) in the architecture and the
failure cascade halts after eight iterations with 27 vertices failed in total, affecting other systems, services, a function, and an operational capability
TABLE 3 Correlations (R2) between vertexmeasures of significance and average triggered cascade size for both use cases using different
threshold profiles
Degree Closeness Centrality Betweenness Centrality Harmonic Closeness Centrality
SAR 𝜙 = 0.2 0.349*** 0.052*** 0.255*** 0.175***
MComms 𝜙 = 0.2 0.281*** 0.211*** 0.190*** 0.000
SAR 𝜙 = 0.3 0.199*** 0.095*** 0.008*** 0.001
MComms 𝜙 = 0.3 0.490*** 0.380*** 0.159*** 0.006***
SAR 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] 0.755*** 0.058 0.437*** 0.189**
MComms 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] 0.639*** 0.388*** 0.120*** 0.000
SAR 𝜙i ∈ [0.251,0.75] 0.304*** 0.052 0.179** 0.007
















∈ [0.1,1.0] 0.861*** 0.419*** 0.337*** 0.052***
*P < .05
**P < .01 and
***P < .001, otherwise R2 is not significant.
network was compared with an unhardened network featuring the
same threshold values. It is worth noting that a direct comparison of
the results between the two SoS architectures is not enabled by this
approach as each architecture contains a different number of vertices.
In order to harden themost critical vertices, this hardening strategy
relies on a posteriori knowledge of the architecture and its vulnerabil-
ity to cascade. An alternative hardening strategy was also considered.
Noting the correlation uncovered earlier between degree and criti-
cality, the 10 highest-degree vertices had their thresholds swapped
with the highest thresholds in the network. Unlike the hardening
procedure outlined above, this hardening strategy relies only on
knowing, and protecting, the most connected entities without any
further knowledge of how susceptible the vertices are to cascades.
The results of these simple hardening strategies are shown in
Figures 15 and 16 and Table 4. Outcomes of the hardening strategies
were comparedwith the unhardened outcomes using aMann-Whitney
two-sample rank-sum U test to determine if the distributions differed
significantly, with the resulting U test statistic and P values provided in
Table 4.
Thevulnerability of theMCommsnetwork to cascading failure is rel-
atively unaffected by either of the hardening strategies when vertex
thresholds are drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.1 and 0.9.
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∈ [0.1,1.0] (bottom). Hardening the 10 highest degree vertices displayedwith half-tone bars, circles, hardening the 10most critical
vertices displayedwith open bars, crosses, and the unhardened network is displayedwith filled bars, squares
This is perhaps because the architecture is already robust to cascades
for this threshold profile, as shown in Figure 15A and in the first row of
Table 4. Consistent with this thinking, both hardening strategies have a
more significant impact for the same network when vertex thresholds
are drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.0 and 1.0, which is
associated with more significant cascades in the unhardened network
(Figure 16).
The results suggest that a simple hardening strategy targeted at
only the 10 most connected entities can reduce the number of cas-
cades triggered to a similar extent as hardening with prior knowledge
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TABLE 4 Summary statistics showing the effect of different hardening strategies on cascade size comparedwith the original unhardened
network cascade size for both use cases (U < UCrit when
Profile IQR Max Median Mean % of events trigger change U
MComms 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] Original 1.28 11.49 1.28 1.89 22%
Hardened bymost vulnerable 1.28 8.09 1.28 1.90 22% 850,872.0*
Hardened by degree 1.70 8.51 1.28 1.91 22% 849,386.5
MComms 𝜙i ∈ [1.0,1.0] Original 3.40 54.47 2.55 4.33 32%
Hardened bymost vulnerable 1.70 11.49 1.28 1.92 22% 820,662.0***
Hardened by degree 2.13 17.02 2.13 2.74 31% 1,535,740.5***
SAR 𝜙i ∈ [0.1,0.9] Original 7.32 87.80 7.32 10.20 43%
Hardened bymost vulnerable 4.88 36.59 7.32 8.78 45% 91,258.5**




∈ [0.1,1.0] Original 3.83 79.15 2.55 6.27 32%
Hardened bymost vulnerable 2.92 37.45 2.13 3.57 32% 1,684,920.0**




∈ [0.1,1.0] Original 87.80 100.00 21.95 41.90 66%
Hardened bymost vulnerable 9.76 100.00 9.76 14.05 59% 124,009.5***
Hardened by degree 9.76 100.00 9.76 12.18 60% 116,041.0***
*P < .05
**P < .01
***P < .001, otherwise not significant)
F IGURE 16 Impact of hardening strategies on theMComms
network 𝜙i ∈ [0.0,1.0]. Hardening the 10 highest degree vertices
(half-tone bars, circles) increases the number of events which do not
cause a cascade to 69%, compared to 67% for the unhardened
network (filled bars, squares). Hardening the 10most critical vertices
(open bars, crosses) increases the number of events which do not
cause a cascade to 78%
of themost vulnerable vertices.Hardening themost connected entities
was sometimes more effective than hardening what were identified as
the most critical vertices, although it is not clear at this stage whether
this is due to the sample size used to determine the most vulnerable
vertices to cascading failure, or if the effect of using the average
cascade size did not sufficiently account for extreme cascade sizes, or
because degree is amore robust predictor of criticality than the results
of the simulated cascades. What is clear, however, is that reducing
vulnerability to cascading failure can be achieved by hardening the
most connected entities in either architecture.
5 DISCUSSION
We return to the worked example to discuss how the findings can
inform system architecture evaluation, where an organization exam-
ining architectural alternatives may consider the overall robustness
of candidate architectures by comparing the impact of random and
targeted vertex removal on network representations of their architec-
tures. An architecture that experiences a more gradual reduction in
average closeness centrality as vertices are removed could be consid-
ered to bemore desirable from this perspective and would correspond
with an architectural pattern that is more densely connected and less
hierarchical. If an organization is not evaluating candidate architec-
tures and is instead interested in understanding the robustness of
one particular architecture, they can examine the vertices that, when
removed, have the largest impact on network viability as a proxy for
architecture effectiveness. While correlations of common network
centrality measures were shown to be unreliable predictors of impor-
tant vertices in terms on their impact on network viability if removed,
organizations may wish to simulate the effect of vertex removal in
order to identify vertices of particular importance in the architecture.
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Similarly, organizations can compare the effect of cascading failures on
their candidate architectures, potentially preferring an architecture
less susceptible to cascading failure, or they can examine if some
architectural entities are significant contributors to the triggering of
substantial cascades. In such cases, organizations maywish to invest in
protecting themost connected architectural entities in order to harden
their architectures. While this finding may seem somewhat obvious,
knowledge of the full extent of architectural entity connectivity may
not be available without adopting a network perspective.
However, at several points throughout this paper, we have raised
the issue that taking a network perspective on complex SoS architec-
tures to support architectural robustness analysis confronts significant
conceptual and technical challenges and these are considered in more
detail here.
Perhaps the most fundamental observation relevant to this dis-
cussion is one that can be made whenever a network perspective is
taken on any real-world system: “the map is not the territory.” An SoS
is not a graph, and neither is an SOS architecture. Rather, an SoS is
a real-world system, actual or envisaged, and an SoS architecture is
a rich set of models, documents, resources, and ideas related to this
real-world system, whereas a network or graph is a mathematical
object comprising only a set of vertices and a set of edges. Taking a
network perspective on a real-world SoS, or SoS architecture, entails
taking a particular stance on what is important and what is not, what
should be represented in the graph andwhat can be omitted. The result
is a network model that is an abstraction, representing parts of the
actual real-world SoS in a particular way. Properties of this network
model are not necessarily straightforward to interpret in terms of
properties of the real-world system of interest. But this interpretation
step is necessary before the implications of network analyses can be
stated or understood.
In some domains, the network model of a real-world system pro-
vides considerable, and relatively direct, insight into this system of
interest and dynamic processes. Consider, for example, social net-
works used to explain and describe complex human activity. Here, a
network analysis might involve calculating the average shortest path
length in a graph representing social interactions between pupils at
a school. Many factors that are true of the real school will not be
captured by such a network, such as which parents are friends with
each other, or whether relationships between children have changed
over time, or whether some children are relatives, or share the same
favourite sports team, etc. Despite this, the path length metric can
be interpreted as a measure that indicates useful things about how
the population of pupils can be expected to behave: How quickly will
gossip or communicable disease spread through the school? How likely
are two pupils to share information? etc.
While the path length metric is only a proxy for the complicated
set of processes and factors that influence the real dynamics of the
school population, it has come to be regarded as a useful proxy. This
is partly as a result of two factors: (a) the relatively straightforward
relationship between path length in a graph and spreading processes
in a social network, and (b) considerable effort by the social science
community in coming to understand the relationship between social
networks as mathematical objects and social networks as real-world
systems.52,53,64,65 Unfortunately, neither of these two factors are as
applicable to network analysis of an SoS or SoS architecture.
Like schools, SoS architectures contain entities that are het-
erogenous and complicated, connected by relations that are also
heterogeneous and complicated. In network models of complex SoS
architectures, vertices may represent communication services, com-
mand and control capabilities, software running on geographically
dispersed assets, the assets themselves, management and administra-
tive functions, data flows, etc. Moreover, the same architecture may
represent the same types of entity at differing levels of description:
individual entities (eg, drones), component subsystems (eg, drone
landing systems), and aggregate supersystems (eg, fleets of drones).
However, although schools are complex, social networks analysis
typically tends to license a social network representation that idealizes
away the diversity and heterogeneity inherent in a population of
pupils: each pupil is represented by a node, each relationship by an
edge, nodes are interchangeable objects, and edges are equivalent to
one another. As a consequence, the meaning of a claim such as “the
shortest path connecting vertex i to vertex j has length four” has a
relatively straightforward meaning in the context of a social network
representing a schoolyard: eg, in order for gossip to travel from i to j it
will tend to have to pass through at least three intermediate children.
The same type of claim is much harder to interpret if i and j instead
represent entities in a complex SoS architecture. What, if anything,
passes along theedges in such anetwork? Is the answer to this question
the same for every edge in the path? What is implied by the fact that
a shortest path is relatively short or relatively long? And if assigning
meaning to a simple measure like path length is challenging for a com-
plex SoS architecture, this challenge is amplified formore sophisticated
measures such as assortativity, eigenvector centrality, etc.
Furthermore, in order to explore issues around robustness and
cascading failure, a conception of failure modes, dynamics and propa-
gation is required, such as knowledge of partial failure propagation.66
Again, such a conception may not always be present at an early design
stage. For a communications network represented at the data link
layer, a failure may equate to the loss of one or more comms devices,
whereas for an air transport network a failure may be characterized as
a cascading delay of flights arising as delays propagate through the sys-
tem. For the SARandMCommsuse cases considered here exactlywhat
and how a failure occurs and propagates is more conceptually chal-
lenging, andmay not even be equivalent across all parts of the network.
Moreover, in order to make direct claims about SoS resilience, the
characterization of system failure discussed above must be extended
to deal with recovery and repair processes. A binary switch between
“effective” and “ineffective” states, as employed in our analyses here,
may not be sufficient to capture the dynamics of failure and recovery
in a real SoS. In particular, the timescales of recovery in different parts
of the system and the mitigating interventions in place may have a
significant influence on recovery.
What types of perturbation should an architecture’s resilience
be evaluated against? Here, we have tended to consider the impact
of a sequence of nodes becoming ineffective, but a more realistic
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characterizationmight allow for several, potentially correlated entities
to become ineffective at the same time. Current studies tend to either
consider independent random failures or targeted attacks. In real
systems, however, scenarios in which multiple problems cooccur tend
to arise as the result of common cause failures, perhaps because
assets are colocated in the same geographical region or subject to the
same latent vulnerability to an extreme environmental factor.67 The
correlated failure profiles that result are not addressed by modeling
either random perturbation or attacks targeting vertices with partic-
ular network properties (eg, high degree). Potential solutions include
providing a weighting to edges in the network,33 or considering “inter-
dependent” network models,38 or adopting an approach cognisant
of vertex connectivity (ie, approaches that consider the “fan-in” or
“fan-out” between vertices).31 However, the intelligence upon which
to base more relevant or sophisticated models of perturbation may be
difficult to collate and interpret, especially at an early design stage, or
for SoS contexts that are innovative or first-of-kind in some respect.
Finally, in order to characterize the negative impact of perturbation
or the positive impact of recovery, some notion of system viability
or performance is required.68,69 To what extent can an effected SoS
be expected to continue to achieve its function? At what point is
system effectiveness wholly compromised by structural changes to its
graphical representation? Is it sufficient to assume that once the SoS
architecture network is fragmented to a certain degree, the associated
SoS architecture is ineffective? How would one determine such a
threshold a priori? While the size of the largest surviving connected
component may be used to characterize the viability of a postattack
graph, and this may be a better measure than simply counting the
number of surviving nodes, this approach may not translate smoothly
to the context of a complex SoS architecture. It may be the case that
the loss of a small number of subcomponents on the “periphery” of
an architecture is likely to be less damaging to overall system viability
than a loss of the same number of entities from the “core” of the
architecture. However, we must be careful not to necessarily equate
the structural core of a graphwith the functional core of an SoS.
To a first approximation, the issues described above tend to stem
from the fact that SoS architectures involve a high degree of hetero-
geneity in their component entities and the relationships among these
entities (see “Guiding Principle 1”33). To the extent that an architecture
is relatively homogeneous (eg, it comprises a set of similar components
organized in some “flat” configuration), relatively standard network
analysis approaches can be applied—although it is still the case
that the interpretation of the results of such analyses may require
careful thought. In the case of less homogeneous SoS architectures,
in order for the desired insights into, say, system robustness to be
more amenable to graph-theoretic analysis it may be appropriate to
examine a more homogeneous subset of the architecture that can be
more readily abstracted as a simple network, eg, the communications
architecture within a complex SoS. However, carving up an SoS in this
way is problematic as it precludes the kind of holistic analysis that
should, ultimately, be the aim of a systems architect working in the
context of a complex SoS project.70
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have taken a network perspective on SoS architecture
analysis in order to assess robustness, by examining the effect of
vertex removal on the overall architecture topology, and vulnerability
to cascading failure. Both analyses may be useful to system architects
looking to inform their evaluations of candidate architectures, by
considering if one architecture is more robust to perturbation than
another. Furthermore, system architects can identify which archi-
tectural entities are important, or influential, in the sense that their
removal affects network viability either as a consequence of the direct
impact of their absence, or the likelihood of their failure triggering a
cascade. In particular, for a complex SoS, such an approachmay support
technical or operational risk identification by identifying particularly
vulnerable architectural entities, and determining if they are within or
outside of an organization’s control.
Both of the architectures analyzed here were are found to be
relatively robust to random vertex removal but more vulnerable to
targeted vertex removal, implying that system architects should pay
particular attention to system architectural entities with high con-
nectivity, noting that without the adoption of a network perspective,
the full extent of an architectural entity’s connectivity may not be
known. While hardening strategies for limiting the extent of cascading
failure were shown to have varying degrees of effectiveness, results
suggested that system architects should look to the most connected
architectural entities as areas of particular concern when seeking to
mitigate the potential impact of cascading failure.
The results presented here for the two real-world use case archi-
tectures suggest that SoS robustness and vulnerability to cascades
depends on both the model imposed on the architecture and the
topology of the architecture, and that improvements in robustness to
cascades may be achieved by hardening the most connected entities.
While the results of such analyses have the potential to inform archi-
tecture design and selection, we argue that a series of challenges need
to be addressed if the approach is to be useful for system architects.
These challenges include the conceptualization of failure dynamics
across heterogeneous system architecture entities, the conceptu-
alization of resilience aspects and approaches to assess network
representations of architectures for both network perturbation and
cascading failure analysis approaches.
The challenges described here are all compounded by the tendency
for system architecting activity to correspond to early system lifecycle
phases where information which would support such evaluations may
be limited. Furthermore, the simple models used here neglect poten-
tially more important contextual information that may be present in
the full architecture, such as recovery strategies or criticality of system
entities for overall functionality.
A network science perspective encourages us to ask important
questions of our system architectures: how robust is our system to
perturbations; how well protected are the most critical architectural
entities; how extensive will the negative impact be when these protec-
tions fail; and how readilywill our systembe able to adapt and recover?
18 POTTS ET AL.
Given that networks science has delivered powerful insights into a
wide range of social and technological systems, it likely also has the
potential to inform our understanding of SoS robustness and resilience
in order to help us answer these questions. However, we argue that
the analyses presented here imply that this will only be possible if
the numerical analyses that networks science enables are deployed
and interpreted through the lens of an appropriately rich contextual
understanding of the system architectures in question.
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